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Agreeing and Implementing the Doha Round of the WTO. Edited by Harald
Hohmann. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. x,
504 ISBN978-0-521-86990-4. UK£70.00; US$126.00
Agreeing and Implementing the Doha Round of the WTO is one of the
first scholarly works produced to assess the progress of the Doha Round of
negotiations under the World Trade Organization. This collection of essays
includes contributions by scholars and practitioners alike from Europe,
America, and Asia, and attempts to balance views from both developed and
developing nations. The aim of the volume is to lay out what has happened in
the Doha Round of negotiations so far, to assess the progress of discussions,
and to analyze their importance for the future development of world trade law.
The book is divided into four parts, each addressing a particular issue.
The first part of the book contains essays on development policy, with two
chapters devoted to examining this issue from a European Union perspective
and a “developing nation” perspective. Part one also includes an article on
the need for domestic policy development, in conjunction with trade
liberalization, in order to eradicate poverty. The final article discusses the
WTO dispute settlement system as a body for implementing the special and
differential principle.
Part two addresses the issue of trade policy, including articles
assessing what has been achieved so far with the Doha Round and what the
future of the talks hold. Part two also includes essays on competition law and
how it could be dealt with outside the WTO framework, the interaction
between liberal globalism and socio-economic and human rights, and the
chemical industry’s views on the progress made in the Doha Round. Part
three examines the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, looking at its history
and its present incarnation and also includes chapters that discuss the
competence of WTO panels in relation to environmental issues and the role of
legal aid in the WTO dispute settlement process.
Part four examines trade in relation to health, the environment, and
social standards. Essays discuss human rights, labor standards, and a possible
climate change regime under the WTO. This part also includes articles
examining the relationship between free trade and the environment and the
WTO measures which may provide protection in the realm of food and health
safety. A final chapter is devoted to the conclusions of the editor.
This book provides an excellent survey of some important issues
surrounding the Doha talks. Of particular interest are chapters that provide
the perspectives of both developed and developing countries on the same
247
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issue. There are several chapters that provide an excellent history of certain
aspects of WTO development as well as the progress of certain issues through
the Doha Round of discussions. To a scholar familiar with the basics of the
WTO and its negotiations, this book provides excellent detail.
However, this book is not for someone new to the scholarship of international
trade issues, in general, or the WTO, in particular. Articles provide very little
in the way of introduction to the WTO, its institutions, and its processes.
Many articles assume a basic familiarity with the jargon and issues of
international trade policy. Readers without this background may find
themselves looking for a primer on the subject in order to be able to
appreciate the substance of the book.
Overall, this book is a useful addition to an international trade policy
collection. It provides essays on a broad range of topics and from a variety of
perspectives. While potentially overwhelming for a person beginning their
studies on the WTO, it provides excellent detail and discussion for the
advanced scholar. Although it suffers from some organizational and editorial
issues, the book provides a great deal of interesting and relevant information
on the topic of the WTO and the Doha negotiations.
Alissa Black-Dorward
Reference Librarian
Fordham University School of Law
Leo T. Kissam Memorial Library
New York, NY USA
The Principality of Monaco: State, International Status, Institutions. By
Georges Grinda. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Pp. xx, 208. ISBN: 978-9-067-04219-2. UK£38.00; US$75.00
The Principality of Monaco is a small independent city-state
surrounded by France on three sides and the Mediterranean Sea to the south.
Monaco has a rich legal and political history. It is a constitutional monarchy
and principality that has been ruled by the Grimaldi family since 1297; the
State's sovereignty was officially recognized by the Franco-Monegasque
Treaty of 1861. The genesis of this book is the 2002 revision of Monaco's
constitution and the Franco-Monegasque Treaty of 24 October 2002. These
two events reinforced the Principality’s statehood by resolving issues of
sovereignty and the risk of a vacancy on the throne. Under the constitutional
revisions, approved by the treaty, only a member of the Grimaldi line can
assume the throne, thereby resolving concerns that Monaco could potentially
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become a French protectorate. This book is in some ways a celebration of
these two events, but it is also much more.
The Principality of Monaco: State, International Status, Institutions is
an English translation of the 2005 book by Georges Grinda entitled La
Principauté de Monaco: l'Etat, son StatutIinternational, ses Institutions. The
author focuses his analysis on Monaco’s constitution, but also discusses the
monarchy, government, National Council, Crown Council, State Council,
legislative system, and courts. In this, his fifth book on the government of
Monaco, Grinda presents an analysis of the nature of government in Monaco
from the perspective of an experienced insider.
Grinda begins each chapter of this highly accessible book with an
introduction to the topic that situates it both historically and within the local
contemporary culture. As the Plenipotentiary Minister of European Affairs
for Monaco, Grinda has had personal experience with Monaco’s interaction
with regional European governmental institutions. In this book, Grinda
assumes the role of cultural ambassador, explaining the vagaries of the unique
city-nation state of Monaco. Grinda’s diplomatic experience lends an
important and distinctive perspective and may be why this book is not exactly
what a reader might initially expect.
This book differs in key ways from traditional introductions to the
law of a country such as French Legal System (2nd edition, 2006) by
Catherine Elliott, Eric Jeanpierre, and Catherine Vernon or Introduction to
French Law (2008) edited by George A. Bermann and Etienne Picard. The
typical introduction to a foreign legal system has sections on civil procedure,
criminal procedure, and other practice-oriented legal topics. By contrast and
as implied by the full title, The Principality of Monaco: State, International
Status, Institutions, this book focuses on governmental structure, international
relations, and institutions instead of systematically covering legal issues by
type of law.
Although it is not a legal research guide, it is a valuable tool for
researchers searching for legal and political information on Monaco.
1
Currently, there are not many legal research guides that focus on
Monaco, and even fewer are in English. Perhaps the most comprehensive
online guide is the “Monaco” chapter in the Foreign Law Guide by Thomas

1

The best source of recent Monegasque law such as codes and the official gazette
is probably the official government website at http://www.monaco.gouv.mc or Legi
Monaco Juris at http://www.legimonaco.mc.
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Reynolds and Arturo Flores.2 While Reynolds and Flores provide a subjectby-subject listing of the sources of Monegasque law, Grinda instead focuses
on the intersection of law and government.
Researchers will find that this book incorporates background
information about the political structure into a textured analysis of the
functioning of the state. They should not expect a list of basic political facts
such as those found in the annual Political Handbook of the World or The
Statesman’s Yearbook. Similarly, The Principality of Monaco: State,
International Status, Institutions addresses Monaco’s constitution without
being an annotated constitution such as Lumb & Moens' The Constitution of
the Commonwealth of Australia Annotated (7th edition, 2007), by Gabriël A.
Moens and John Trone.
Because Grinda’s book includes features from various types of
publications, it can be a reference to researchers who want to know where to
find certain types of legal and government information about Monaco.
Grinda discusses the history, function, and status of the Monegasque State.
He provides an excellent overview of the constitution, important treaties,
government structure, origins of the State, and Monaco’s status in the
international community. The book contains extensive citations to source
documents, and following the three page bibliography, there is a section
entitled “Documentation,” which provides a brief annotated list of official
sources and where to find them. As annexes to the book, the author provides
the full-text to both the Constitution of the Principality of Monaco and the
Franco-Monegasque Treaty of 24 October 2002 in English translation.
The Principality of Monaco: State, International Status, Institutions is a good
choice for those interested in the legal history of Monaco, the international
status of Monaco, the constitution of Monaco, or the structure of Monaco’s
government. While a researcher could find some of this information in other
publications and web sites, this book provides a unique insider perspective on
Monaco’s place in the international community. It is a well-suited choice for
a college, university, or law school library.
Catherine Deane & Vincent Moyer
Foreign, Comparative & International Law Department
Hastings College of the Law Library
San Francisco, CA USA
2

The Foreign Law Guide at http://www.foreignlawguide.com is a subscription
service. An extensive search also yielded the basic Library of Congress legal
research guide to Monaco at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/nations/monaco.php
and an LLRX guide to the micro-states at http://www.llrx.com/features/microstates.htm#Monaco.
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The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in International Law. By Michael
G. Kearney. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xiii,
274. ISBN: 978-0-19-923245-1. UK£60.00; US$145.00.
Kearney’s book is a self-described effort to move the prohibition of
propaganda for war from the footnotes of academic literature to the forefront
of international law discourse. To this end, Kearney seeks to provide the
“comprehensive analysis” he asserts is missing from, and necessary to, a full
understanding of the meaning and scope of such a prohibition’s proper
position in international law. Creating accountability, he asserts, is the next
logical step in the development of international law and a necessary measure
in the prevention of war. His efforts have produced a book that is a valuable
perspective on an issue that has been marginalized for far too long.
While clearly passionate about his topic, Kearney constructs his
argument with a composure that underscores his points with intellect rather
than emotion. His analysis is sound and supported by extensive footnotes that
connect the reader to multiple sources of law drawn from history and the
present that, true to the traditional process of the development of international
law, establish evidence of international standards which, Kearney argues,
should be codified by the International Law Commission to recognize a
prohibition of propaganda for war, or, at least, a crime of incitement to
aggression. The norms, according to Kearney, have generally been adequate;
the problem is that they have not been enforced. Kearney provides a history
lesson in the international development of the prohibition of propaganda for
war in which he focuses not only on the more obvious sources, such as
treaties, non-governmental resolutions, and resolutions of the League of
Nations, but also places a strong emphasis on the analysis used by national
and international criminal tribunals to address the issue of propaganda’s
contribution to the wrongs they seek to redress. This collective jurisprudence
in fact becomes the mortar of his argument that a prohibition against
propaganda for war, although not yet clear precedent, is by analogy already
firmly entrenched in an important part of the international legal community.
Kearney also examines the goal of those who established the International
Military Tribunal and notes that it explicitly created accountability not only
for those responsible for the events of the time, but also for those whose
actions [propaganda] created an environment in which such events were
possible.
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Kearney also looks to the General Assembly of the United Nations for
evidence of recurring resolutions and declarations that, he argues, established
an obligation on the part of states to abstain from the use of propaganda for
war. Kearney thereby seeks to establish a custom of condemning propaganda
for war through the resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly of
the United Nations. He acknowledges that the persistent hesitation on the part
of Western democracies, together with the 1976 adoption of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the General Assembly and the end
of the Cold War, eventually led to the end of the passage of resolutions
addressing propaganda for war. However, he states this is evidence that the
Assembly apparently considered the Covenant sufficient to address the issue.
Kearney agrees that Article 20(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is the most significant provision dealing with propaganda for
war in international human rights law, and herein lies the heart of the book.
He discusses its perceived weaknesses, the primary two of which are the lack
of a definition of propaganda for war and the perceived threat to freedom of
expression. He disposes of the matter of risk to freedom of expression by not
only pointing out that is a freedom that is expressly protected by the
convention, but also by drawing a distinction between individual speech and
governmental speech. He ultimately identifies the two rights as
complementary to each other, rather than in contradiction with one another, as
a result of the greater individual freedoms that result from judicious
enforcement of such a prohibition.
The lack of a definition of propaganda for war requires more of his
attention and, even after his thorough analysis, remains an unresolved issue.
However, he can be forgiven for this because his purpose is not to pin down
definitions for terms such as “propaganda” and “war,” but rather to provide an
understanding of each within the context of the phrase “propaganda for war,”
and this he does well. Kearney is not content to accept the position of the
delegates in support of Article 20(1), some of whom were satisfied with the
notion, “I’ll know it when I see it.” He instead examines the issue in more
detail, drawing on the debates to identify the two distinct elements of
propaganda for war as “incitement to war” and “the repeated and insistent
expression of an opinion for the purpose of creating a climate of hatred and
lack of understanding between the peoples of two or more countries, in order
to bring them eventually to armed conflict.”
In his analysis of the years that ensued after the passage of Article
20(1), Kearney reviews how individual nations have interpreted and applied
the prohibition of propaganda for war and, in doing so, reaches two
conclusions. First, he confirms his conclusion that a prohibition of
propaganda for war is not a violation of the right to freedom of expression.
Second, he rejects the notion that there are inadequate resources to which
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nations may turn for an appropriate definition of propaganda for war. In fact,
he asserts, the failure of states to define the term precisely is a violation of the
obligation of nations to observe international law and serves to misinterpret
and misapply the Article, which in turn leads to “an intolerable undermining
of the entire international human rights framework.”
Ultimately, Kearney argues, the difficulties in pinning down a
definition should not stop us from moving forward with developing a
resolution to the issue. Specifically, Kearney proposes, there should be
included “a distinct crime of direct and public incitement to aggression in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” His proposition, while
politically provocative, is timely and therefore relevant and deserving of our
close attention. Kearney presents this as an “opportunity for the
reinvigoration of the principal at hand.” His assertion is based upon the
premise that if an act is illegal under international law, then so is “incitement
intended and likely to lead to that act.” Kearney supports this principle with
several examples in both international and state law.
Kearney makes the logical point that even if he is unsuccessful in
what he advocates, the issue will continue to be raised for review in the
International Criminal Court. He advocates enforcement of violations of the
prohibition through the International Court of Justice as a forum for hearing
cases which, he feels, the Human Rights Committee has neglected to address,
and additionally states the necessity for state legislation giving effect to
Article 20(1) of the Covenant.
Kearney is successful in his goal that the book will stimulate
discussion among its readers. There is no doubt that it will do so; it is a
significant contribution to this debate and could serve as a valuable resource
for the leaders of our country. Whether it will contribute to the future
development of international law remains to be seen. Regardless, the text of
his book, together with the supporting (and sometimes contrasting) footnotes
and extensive bibliography, combine to create a comprehensive source of all
of the international laws relevant to a discussion of prohibition of propaganda
for war in international law, and the book is therefore additionally successful
as an important reference tool for those seeking an outline of the scope of the
prohibition in the international law context. As an aside, readers will also
find it interesting to read about Kearney’s brief review of the history and
techniques of propaganda for war, including the exploitation of emotion and
intellect through the selective presentation of information and the use of
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persuasion. His analysis serves to inform us not just as academics but also as
voters and conscientious citizens.
Amy Emerson
Research Attorney
Cornell Law Library
Ithaca, NY USA
Finding Solutions for Environmental Conflicts: Power and Negotiation. By
Edward Christie. Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, MA; Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2008. Pp. xvii, 335. ISBN 978-1-84720-070-9. UK£75.00;
US$140.00
Written as part of the New Horizons in Environmental Law Series,
Edward Christie’s Finding Solutions for Environmental Conflicts: Power and
Negotiation presents an analysis of how to use alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) to settle environmental conflicts. In the introductory chapter, the
author reviews the history of environmental law and chronicles the
development and structure of ADR. There is an analysis of how the litigation
and ADR approaches will differ in how they solve environmental conflicts. In
his initial comparison between ADR and litigation, Mr. Christie states, in
litigation, “judges adjudicate on disputes and impose a binding decision on
the parties” while in ADR, “the dispute resolver’s role is to assist the parties
to resolve their conflict by finding their own solution through a negotiated
agreement.” This chapter also sets the stage for the rest of the book by
explaining the reasons why ADR should be considered in environmental
conflicts.
Following the introduction, Mr. Christie structures the book into three
parts. The first part discusses environmental decision-making, enforcement of
environmental legislation, and public participation, and shows how the United
States, United Kingdom, and Australia each have addressed the relevant
issues in legislation, regulations, and case law. Chapter two explores the
cross-disciplinary aspects of environmental conflicts, including traditional
questions of law and scientific findings that affect decisions in such conflicts.
Knowledge power, which is the concept that understanding the legal or
scientific facts for a particular conflict gives a participant a level of power in
settling the conflict, is introduced in this chapter and discussed in further
detail in subsequent chapters. In chapter three, the author discusses aspects of
participation in environmental conflicts and how the different countries have
responded to either encourage or discourage public participation. It explores
concepts such as knowledge of indigenous peoples and freedom of
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information legislation and how they affect participation. The last chapter in
this part provides a detailed analysis of the enforcement of environmental
laws in the three countries and how the enforcement can impact moving from
a litigation model to a negotiation or ADR model.
Chapters five through nine represent the second part of the book and
focus on specific issues relating to environmental conflicts. The topics
covered include sustainable development, protection of endangered species,
control of hazardous waste, and biotechnology. These chapters discuss how
the regulation and legislation in the U.S., U.K., and Australia have developed
to address these diverse issues. There is also a chapter relating to
environmental impact assessment and how legislation requires that
environmental impact be evaluated and reported. Each of these chapters
concludes with a comparison of how litigation and ADR approaches to the
issue and highlights the positive aspects of ADR.
In the final chapter, Mr. Christie presents a model for ADR in
environmental conflicts. It is a step-by-step approach to resolving such a
conflict. Seeing each step as a distinct phase, which requires a different type
of dispute resolution, Mr. Christie gives a clear description of the different
techniques of dispute resolution that will best apply in each phase. In addition
to the process, he stresses the importance of the dispute resolver having the
necessary scientific or legal knowledge depending on the type of conflict and
the stage in the resolution problem.
Finding Solutions for Environmental Conflicts: Power and Negotiation is a
well-written book that provides the reader with a clear understanding of the
issues that generally arise in environmental conflicts, how those issues are
addressed through litigation and the administrative decision-making process,
and how using ADR can produce more equitable and long-lasting solutions.
With a background in ecology, environmental law, and mediation, Edward
Christie is knowledgeable about the subject of the book and has the expertise
needed to tie the distinct areas together. The book includes prolific references,
as well as a table of cases and a table of authorities, which are helpful given
the detailed discussion of the environmental statutes, regulations, and cases
from the U.S., U.K., and Australia. Written as a practical guide for
environmental practitioners, this book can also be useful for students of
environmental law or ADR, because it provides information on a variety of
environmental law topics and shows how ADR can be used to address them.
Karin Johnsrud
Head of Reference
Fordham Law School Library
New York, NY USA
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The Reception of English Law Abroad. By B.H. McPherson. Brisbane,
Australia: Supreme Court of Queensland Library, 2007. Pp. xlv, 520. ISBN
9780975123096. A$88.00.
In The Reception of English Law Abroad describes the dissemination
and adoption of English law throughout the British colonial empire.
According to the author, the charters issued by the crown provided the basis
for “many of the principles that determine the character of government and
law in distant places at the present day.” Likening the law to the English
language, McPherson states that “transposing the law overseas produced
different accents and usages involving adjustments and changes to many of its
rules.”
The author attempts to establish the basis for the unique
manifestations of English law among the countries under British rule. Unlike
other European imperial powers, which instituted their own national legal
systems in their territories, McPherson claims that “England did nothing.”
Although there are many theories for this inaction, McPherson argues that “a
free Englishman could not be bound by laws made without his consent or that
of an assembly in which he was represented.”
In so arguing, McPherson discounts two theories, namely, that
colonists rejected English law and that English law was “incapable” of export
outside of the English realm. He discounts the first theory, noting that the
American War of Independence was a result of the colonist’s belief that they
had been denied the rights of Englishmen. In addressing the second theory,
McPherson notes the instances of Wales and Ireland, specifically, the Acts of
Parliament in 1536 and 1543 in the case of Wales and the Case of Tanistry,
decided in 1608, in the case of Ireland.
The law as a “natural birthright,” in practice, was transplanted by
colonists and “later confirmed by legislation.” Meanwhile, existing local
legal systems, such as in India, were allowed to coexist with the transplanted
English law. Indeed, McPherson describes English law as “peculiarly
responsive to local circumstances of place and people,” providing a basis for
the development of local legal systems. But he also notes a number of
contributing factors, i.e., land law, government, nationality, individual rights,
and legislation. McPherson then dedicates succeeding chapters to each of
these factors.
Land law, as a factor in the reception of English law, was based on
sovereignty over territory, whether by conquest or cession, as a result of
conquest or acquisition, or discovery and occupation, in which the crown
sought to exercise governmental authority over the discovered land. The goal
of the English was to establish friendly relations with the indigenous

2009]

BOOK REVIEWS

257

inhabitants and negotiate the purchase of land. As a result, customary land
tenures were largely left undisturbed. One of the issues addressed by
McPherson is the private purchase of land from native owners, the title of
which, he notes, was vested in the crown and acted as a burden on that title,
because only the crown had “power to acquire the land or extinguish . . .
[native] rights.” To convey special privileges to English people residing
abroad, including grants of land, the crown issued charters.
The next factor contributing to the spread of English law abroad was
tied intimately to the first. Once land was granted to English settlers, the next
logical step was the governing of those settlers. Because Parliament did not
have the staff to supervise colonial possessions, the task fell to the crown.
Governors were appointed and they initiated legislation to be passed by local,
representative assemblies, subject to the British Constitution. Government in
the colonies was to be exercised to English standards and local laws were not
to be “repugnant, but . . . agreeable to the laws and statutes of England,”
including legislation and taxation. Parliament’s power, generally, to enact
laws extending abroad to the colonies was limited, based on the narrower
principle that Englishmen could not be taxed without representation.
However, the Council for Trade and Plantations exercised administrative
review of local legislation.
Nationality was another factory contributing to the spread of English
law abroad. The basis for nationality was feudal in nature, determined by
birth in a place owing allegiance to the crown. As such, the subject owed
loyalty to the crown and, in turn, the crown owed protection and peace
through its government and laws. In addition to birth, British nationality
could be acquired by Acts of Parliament and letters of denisation. Once
attached, the status of a British subject was perpetual to him and his
descendents. Without British nationality, individuals were prevented from
owning, transferring, or inheriting land; exercising political rights and holding
political office; and engaging in trade and shipping.
Individual rights, English liberties, or “natural rights of all mankind . .
. the security of life, liberty and property” were transmitted to the colonies via
charters, commissions, royal instructions, etc. In addition, they were reenacted in local assemblies or imported under the doctrine of colonial
birthright. These rights were recognized in both England, by the Privy
Council and legal scholars, and her colonies. However, the unwillingness of
Parliament to recognize these rights in North America was credited with the
War for Independence and the loss of the American colonies.
Despite the birthright theory of English law, local adoption of
common law was based, for the most part, on legislation. English law could
be imposed in the case of captured or ceded territories (the conquest rule or
cession rule). It could be introduced into a colony by an enactment of
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Parliament. Finally, local legislative bodies could enact reception laws on
their own initiative, as was most often the case.
Even with the granting of independence, imperial statutes and
legislative instruments often provided for the continuation of English law in
former colonies. In addition, as British influence expanded throughout the
world, English law was introduced. For example, on the issue of the slavery,
Great Britain sought to suppress the slave trade in the early 19th century
internationally, not only in Africa, but also in the Middle East and the
Western Pacific Ocean. Commercial ventures and accompanying treaties
with local political entities introduced English law to Africa, the Near East,
the Middle East, and the Far East.
Generally, where the reception of English law occurred, the whole of
English law was received. Exceptions to this rule were territories where other
legal systems were already in place. Regarding the character of the law
received, common law rules, under the birthright principle, were adopted as
common law. If common law rules or English statutes were re-enacted
locally, they were adopted as statutes. However, statutes adopted under
general reception laws were adopted as common law.
Exception to the reception of English law existed. These exceptions
were usually considered to be unsuitable to local conditions. They were more
often legislative in nature, since common law was considered a form of
natural law. The received law could be expressly repealed; deemed
inconsistent or repugnant to local customary law, so as to force the received
law to cease to operate; or revised.
In addition to the law itself, judicial administration in the colonies
was usually based on a court system patterned after the English court system.
Finally, key to the reception of English law was the educating and training of
lawyers. The development of lawyers was limited to learning from
practitioners or self-study. Opportunity for either was limited in the colonies.
Some seeking to study the law returned to England to study at the Inns of
Court, while others articled, attached themselves to practicing attorneys, or
“read with leading counsel at the bar.” However, legal texts were limited
until the publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law of England,
which was widely published and disseminated.
This book is an excellent historical overview of the basis for the
reception of English law throughout the world, especially in jurisdictions that
were at one time subject to English rule. It is thoroughly documented, not
only with footnotes throughout the text, but also with a table of cases. In
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addition, it is accessible with an index of names and places, as well as a
subject index.
Dennis S. Sears
Associate Director for Legal Research Instruction
Howard W. Hunter Law Library
J. Reuben Clark Law School
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT USA

The Power and Purpose of International Law, Insights from the Theory and
Practice of Enforcement. By Mary Ellen O’Connell. Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 408. ISBN 9780195368949. UK£26.00;
US$45.00.
Critics of international law have long claimed that it is not law at all,
but merely reflects the practice of states acting in their own political or
economic self-interests. These "realists" point to inadequate sanctions and
weak enforcement of international rules as important evidence against the
idea of international law as binding. In response, Professor Mary Ellen
O’Connell’s recent book, The Power and Purpose of International Law,
Insights from the Theory and Practice of Enforcement, argues that both the
existence and enforcement of meaningful sanctions demonstrate that states do
believe that international law is binding, and "[i]nternational law's claim to be
law is based ultimately on belief." (p. 9) In support of her thesis, O'Connell
briefly traces the history of international law theory, enumerates the types of
sanctions authorized by international law, and marshals substantial evidence
of enforcement. In her systematic study of sanctions, unilateral, multilateral,
international, and domestic, the author builds a convincing case in support of
the legitimacy of international law.
The long-standing view that international law is not truly law
received renewed attention with the rise of "neoconservative" American
political thought in the early years of the new millennium and with the
appearance of The Limits of International Law by Richard L. Goldsmith and
Eric A. Posner in 2003.3 In that book, the authors argued that international
"law" mainly described the political practice of states and did not furnish an
3
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independent legal basis for constraining state action. Instead, international
law simply provided a guide for states in pursuing their political self-interest.
Weak sanctions and inadequate enforcement of international rules indicated
that international law did not exert an independent pull on states to comply
with its tenets.
One of the motivations for Professor O’Connell’s book seems to have
been to respond to the arguments, especially those relating to sanctions and
enforcement, in the Goldsmith and Posner book. She devotes a lengthy
section in her book to refuting systematically the arguments of Goldsmith and
Posner. At the outset, O'Connell questions the use of an economic rationalchoice method to evaluate state compliance with international norms.
Goldsmith and Posner assume for the most part that individuals and states act
rationally to maximize self-interest, an assumption that O'Connell notes is
contrary to the "now-massive" literature on cognitive psychology, as well as
independent evidence that individuals and states may on occasion disregard
self-interest and act morally or altruistically. Goldsmith and Posner also
discount as "cheap talk," statements by international actors that acknowledge
the binding force of international law. In their view, when these statements
come from representatives of governments, international organizations, or
non-governmental organizations, they presumably amount to little more than
political rhetoric. O’Connell criticizes this view as arrogant, because it values
the authors’ own assumptions about a speaker's beliefs more than the
speaker's own explanations of the belief. Finally, she asserts that Goldsmith
and Posner have omitted and mischaracterized the sources and methods of
enforcement of international law, and much of her book is devoted to
addressing those failings.
In addition to identifying the specific flaws she sees in Goldsmith and
Posner's arguments, O'Connell emphasizes their context in the Bush
administration's post-9/11 attempts to defend the "War on Terror."4 During
that period, Goldsmith served in the General Counsel's Office of the
Department of Defense and then in Legal Counsel's Office of the Justice
Department. In contrast to other attempts to defend the legality, under
international law, of Bush-administration practices such as "harsh"
interrogation techniques and extraordinary rendition, Goldsmith and Posner
instead challenged the fundamental legitimacy of international law itself.
Based on their economic analysis of state compliance with international law,
they concluded that international law was merely descriptive of what states
would do anyway and that it did not provide an independent basis for binding
4
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states against their pursuit of self-interest. Instead, international law served
merely as a set of guidelines, or a "special kind of politics,” that states might
or might not follow.5
O'Connell makes much of the dangers of publicly criticizing
international law at all, contending that any criticism could encourage the
actions of those who seek to evade external checks on their behavior. She
explains her lengthy reply to Goldsmith and Posner's book as an attempt to
dissuade “U.S. elites" from seizing on their arguments to justify
noncompliance with international law. O'Connell’s emphasis, however, is on
various objections to Goldsmith and Posner's assumptions, arguments, and
methodology; instead, she affirmatively champions the legitimacy of
international law by tracing its deep intellectual roots and compiling evidence
of substantial enforcement practice, with an emphasis on state practice in
recent decades. O’Connell's thesis is that the very existence of sanctions for
the violation of international norms, along with the considerable evidence of
enforcement over the past decades, demonstrates the legitimacy and impact of
international law.
For the most part, the author builds her argument clearly and
efficiently. She begins her discussion of enforcement, however, in an uneven
chapter on “classical enforcement theory.” O’Connell’s dilemma was to lay
the intellectual foundations for her arguments on international law
enforcement practice without distracting the reader from her larger themes
with too much detail. To do justice to a basic intellectual history of
international law would require substantial explanation, but spending even
more time on background material than she does might sidetrack a reader
impatient to get to the crux of her thesis on modern enforcement theory and
practice. Although the historical background she provides is instructive, an
unfamiliar reader might wish for more detail or for clearer links to the
author’s later points. The familiar reader, in contrast, may perhaps find this
introductory overview very basic, in contrast to her later historical treatment
of specific sanctions and enforcement practice.
The chapter recites a chronological history of the thinking of
international law theorists on enforcement, summarizing basic philosophical
themes. Beginning with Christian and Roman ideas about universally
applicable principles of natural law, “just-war” theory formed the basis for
early international law rules governing armed conflict. To have a just war, a
state could not wage war solely to pursue its own political or commercial selfinterest. The right to wage war was subject to higher principles; indeed, the
ruler had to have “a just cause, right intention, and right authority.” (p. 22)
O'Connell briefly traces the development of just-war theory by summing up
5
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the ideas of Cicero, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, the Spanish Scholastics,
and other just-war thinkers within the space of a few pages.
She highlights in more detail the philosophy of Hugo Grotius, the
seventeenth-century Dutch diplomat, philosopher, and Christian apologist
whose natural law theories laid the foundations of international law. In
Grotius' view, the use of force could be legitimate, but it had to be
proportional to the wrong, aimed only at the wrongdoer, intended to redress
the wrong rather than to seek revenge, and ordinarily, serve only as a last
resort in enforcing the law. O'Connell points out that most of these ideas still
apply to the modern rules regulating force in international law. Despite some
enduring themes from its natural-law beginnings, however, international law
theory later evolved in another direction away from rules inherently
applicable to all people and towards the positivist view in the nineteenthcentury that sovereign states could create law binding on other sovereign
states only by mutual consent.
O'Connell devotes most of her book to showing that sanctions and
enforcement together manifest the belief of states in the binding force of
international law. Sanctions serve a number of functions: identifying legally
binding rules, coercing violators into compliance, and encouraging respect for
international law, thus decreasing the need for actual enforcement. General
compliance with international law rules demonstrates that states accept the
legitimacy of those rules.
Even though enforcement is an integral part of a legal system,
O’Connell argues persuasively that judging the nature and legitimacy of a law
by its enforcement alone is problematic. In support, she draws convincing
parallels to areas of domestic law that are poorly or inconsistently enforced,
but that are regarded nevertheless as legally binding rules: e.g., traffic laws,
tax laws, domestic violence laws, child support laws, and immigration laws.
The enforcement of these domestic laws is notoriously lax or inconsistent, but
no one would dispute their legitimacy as binding law. In domestic law, the
mere existence of a sanction for violating the law is more important than
vigorous and consistent enforcement. Similarly, O’Connell argues, if a
sanction is possible for the violation of an international rule, that is evidence
of the rule’s status as binding law as well. Perfect enforcement is not
necessary domestically or internationally as long as the rules are, in fact,
subject to a possible legal consequence.
O’Connell scrutinizes the history and practice of states in applying
the sanctions available under international law. "International law has been
treated as binding by states throughout history: Claims are made on the basis
of it; lawsuits are filed, and enforcement measures applied." (p. 4) She
examines armed sanctions and countermeasures, distinguishing among

2009]

BOOK REVIEWS

263

unilateral and multilateral, international and domestic sanctions, and she
catalogs numerous examples for each type.
As the logical baseline for international law enforcement, the United
Nations Charter in article 2(4) broadly prohibits a state from using force in its
international relations. O'Connell emphasizes the significance of that
provision in establishing positive law in the international community.
Nevertheless, in the years since the Charter's adoption, the large number of
inter-state armed conflicts has convinced some scholars that the Charter has
not constrained states significantly in their use of force. In this view, if
international law is based only on the consent of sovereign states, then
conduct that is inconsistent with a rule could nullify its binding effect.
O'Connell vigorously challenges the notion that the UN Charter has declined
in its legal effect and instead finds significance in how states justify their use
of force: they do not assert that the Charter is not binding, but instead claim
that they are complying with one of its exceptions. It is the official positions
of states that make positive law, O'Connell argues, so even the states that
violate an international law rule can reinforce its legitimacy by claiming they
are acting in compliance.
The main exception to the Charter's prohibition against armed force is
self-defense, which O'Connell considers to be a type of international law
enforcement, given the connection between self-defense and the historic right
to use war to enforce international rules. A state may use force in defending
itself only in response to an armed attack, if it notifies the UN Security
Council, if the armed force targets the responsible state, and if the defense is
necessary and proportional. Thus, the Charter does not authorize preemptive
self-defense and authorizes unilateral action only until the Security Council
acts.
With regard to collective armed measures, O'Connell vividly contrasts
the "deeply held understanding in the international community that force
should only be used as authorized by law" with intense interest by some in
using force to enforce rules and further policy. (p. 195) The UN Security
Council retains the authority to use force beyond self-defense, to maintain
peace and security, but O'Connell asserts the need for greater certainty about
what international norms should govern Security Council action. She
explains the development of peacekeeping operations as the result of
international interest and desire to respond to conflicts, despite Security
Council inertia or disagreement. She does not, however, categorize traditional
peacekeeping as an enforcement measure, because peacekeeping actions have
the consent of the warring parties and peacekeepers take no coercive action to
enforce a ceasefire. Her accounts of the tragedies in the former Yugoslavia,
in Somalia, and in Rwanda vividly illustrate the shortcomings of traditional
peacekeeping actions.
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Although the Charter's language is quite broad, article 2(4)'s
prohibition has been interpreted to mean only armed force. Other types of
self-help by states, e.g., economic, political, or physical force not involving
arms, are considered only countermeasures. Thus, actions that would
otherwise violate international law, including low-level force, to respond to a
prior violation of law no longer constitute "reprisals" under the classic
definition, but are now deemed to be acceptable countermeasures.
Countermeasures are now the primary means for states to enforce
international legal rights, and states use them regularly. To be a legitimate
means of enforcement, countermeasures must respond to a legal wrong, be
proportional to the injury, and be aimed at inducing compliance. (p. 264)
Finally, O'Connell discusses the role of courts in interpreting and
applying international law rules. Not only are domestic and international
tribunals important in recognizing the existence of sanctions, but they also
play an increasing role in applying them. The adjudications of courts and
tribunals can authorize actions as legitimate sanctions and not just self-help
actions of reprisal or revenge.
In contrast to the systematic and detailed treatment of her subject in
the main body of The Power and Purpose of International Law, O’Connell’s
conclusion section is a bit thin and misses the opportunity to reinforce the
book’s central themes by pulling together all threads of her argument.
Nevertheless, the reader comes away from the book with a solid
understanding of the key ideas relating to the role and effectiveness of
international law sanctions and ample historical evidence of enforcement
practice. O'Connell's treatment of her subject overall is scholarly and
thorough, and her book effectively answers critics who rely on the absence of
meaningful legal consequences to question the fundamental legitimacy of
international law.
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